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During the 2007 calendar year, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
provided health physics support for the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Transparency 
Program for external and internal radiation protection and technical expertise related to 
BDMS radioactive sources and Russian radiation safety regulatory compliance.  For the 
calendar year 2007, there were 172 person-trips that required dose monitoring of the U.S. 
monitors.  Of the 172 person-trips, 160 person-trips were SMVs and 12 person-trips were 
Transparency Monitoring Office (TMO) trips.  There were 12 monitoring visits by TMO 
monitors to facilities other than UEIE and 10 to UEIE itself.  There were two monitoring 
visits (source changes) that were back to back with 14 monitors.  LLNL’s Hazard Control 
Division laboratories provided the dosimetry services for the HEU Transparency 
monitors.   
 
External Dosimetry   
 
LLNL provided 882 TLD dosimeters in 2006 for monitoring potential external dose: 438 
personal dosimeters, 224 control dosimeters and 220 spares to Pragma and TMC in 
Moscow.  Approximately 500 of the dosimeters supplied were returned and were not 
read.  This number includes the unused spare dosimeters from Pragma and Moscow and 
both the personal and control arbitration TLDs left in Russia until a post trip dose letter is 
provided.  However, both read and unread TLDs needed to be zeroed and re-calibrated 
before subsequent use.  
 
In 2007, all HEU Transparency monitors went on assignments in Russia with a complete 
set of personal and control dosimeters.  In order to avoid a failure of a trip mission due to 
lost dosimeters at customs, a pool of 60 spare dosimeters was maintained at TMC in 
Moscow, in addition to the 50 spare TLDs at the Pragma office.  The spare dosimeters are 
exchanged semi-annually.  Customs letters for both the U.S. and Russian customs were 
included in the dosimeters packages for each trip to facilitate customs inspections if 
needed.   LLNL retrieved all 2007 arbitration dosimeters from the monitored Russian 
nuclear facilities.  The TLDs from the last trips in 2007 were retrieved by the first trips in 
2008.   
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In 2007 we received the external dose readings from the Russian TLDs supplied to the 
U.S. monitors by the plants as follows: 
 
• SChE – for all SMVs and all monitors 
• MPA – for all SMVs and all monitors 
• ECP – for all SMVs and all monitors 
• UEIE - none 
 
In 2007 LLNL provided DOE’s HEU Transparency Program management with post trip 
dose reports after each trip.  All HEU monitors received zero doses from external 
radiation exposure in 2007.   
 
External dose investigations 
For any dosimeter reading above 10 mrem, the arbitration TLD was analyzed together 
with the reported dose from the Russian TLD, when available, in order to evaluate if the 
monitor has/has not received an occupational dose from the HEU assignment in Russia. 
The accumulated personal dose history, the arbitration and Russian TLDs, and the 
radiological data from the plants are used to resolve exposure investigations.  The 
Russian plants report different minimum dose recording levels from the Russian TLDs:  
MPA – 10 mrem, ECP – 5 mrem and SChE – 5 mrem.   
 
No external dose concerns were raised during the 2007 calendar year. 
 
Internal Dosimetry   
 
A total of 156 bioassay samples were submitted in 2007: 150 post-trip (for uranium) and 
six baseline samples (for uranium and plutonium).  All HEU Transparency monitors who 
participated in assignments in Russian uranium processing facilities have provided 
baseline bioassay samples.  All post trip bioassay samples from the 2007 calendar year 
were analyzed.  Two of the post trip bioassay samples showed results slightly above the 
investigation level.  The subsequent investigations showed results that were below or at 
the normal background level and resulted in no internal dose assigned.  One of the cases 
included both additional alpha spectroscopy analysis of the sample and request and 
analysis of additional follow-up bioassay sample.  The second case was resolved on the 
basis of subsequent alpha spectroscopy analysis only.  There were no other internal dose 
concerns.  
 
The internal dose is assigned based on the bioassay result (content of uranium 
compounds in urine), appropriate biokinetic models, chemical and physical form of 
uranium compounds, and other pertinent information.  The minimum detectable internal 
dose (MDD) from uranium bioassays depends on several factors, two of which are the 
chemical and physical form of the uranium compound and the time elapsed between a 
potential uranium intake and the time the bioassay sample was provided.  We cannot 
control the first parameter, however we can try to shorten the time the bioassay sample is 
collected by obtaining it as close as possible to the day of the return to the USA.  This 
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allows lower uranium intakes and doses to be detected and will improve the reliability of 
the internal dose assessment. 
 
The established bioassay procedure requires each monitor to provide a post trip bioassay 
sample within three days of arrival in the USA.  For 2007 calendar year, 87% of the 
samples were in compliance with this requirement, with the average time interval 
between the arrival of the monitors in the USA and the providing of the post trip bioassay 
sample being 1.85 days.  Only seven monitors have provided bioassay sample more than 
10 days after their return to the U.S.A.  Appendix A of this report has a chart providing 
information on the bioassay sample compliance for 2007 calendar year. 
 
In 2007, LLNL provided the HEU Transparency Program management with quarterly 
internal dose reports (bioassay reports) containing information on the internal dose, the 
baseline bioassays, the procedure compliance and the status of bioassay samples 
received, analyzed and in process of being analyzed.   
 
HEU health physics information database 
 
LLNL maintains a confidential database for the HEU radiation protection data.  The 
database contains historical external and internal dose information for every HEU 
Transparency monitor, as well as specific information for each trip, TLDs supplied, 
returned or left in Russia, baseline bioassays, submitted signed exposure release form and 
monitor’s data.  The health physics database is essential for generating the post trip and 
the annual dose reports.  The HEU health physics database was updated in 2007 to track 
the quarterly bioassay reports and the annual reports to DOE and individual monitors.  In 
order to comply with the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1984, we have obtained and 
keep on file signed Radiation Exposure Release forms for all HEU Transparency 
monitors that had assignments in the calendar year 2007.   
 
The individual annual occupational dose information for each monitor for 2007, detailing 
the total dose as well as the external and internal doses from each monitoring assignment, 
was mailed to each monitor in January 2008. 
 
2007 Radiological data from the Russian plants 
 
The 2007 radiological data, received from the Russian uranium processing plants under 
the HEU agreement, do not indicate that there are radiological concerns for the U.S.  
monitors working in Russia who follow the work and personnel protection guidelines. 
The plant radiological data include gamma exposure rates, airborne and removable 
surface contamination levels in the areas visited by the U.S. monitors.  This data 
supplements the information from the U.S. dosimeters and the bioassay sample analysis.  
The annexes have provisions for all plants that the radiological environment data be 
provided to the U.S. for the areas visited by the U.S. monitors.  However, the annexes do 
not specify what data, in what format, over what time intervals averaged or any other 
details to be provided to the U.S.  For example, a provision for sharing contamination or 
radiological accident data affecting the U.S. monitors is not specified in the annexes.   
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In 2007 we received the following radiological data from the plants: 
 
• ECP –  gamma exposure rates, surface alpha contamination, and airborne alpha 
contamination for each day of the SMV and for all SMVs; 
• MPA –gamma exposure rates, surface alpha contamination, and airborne alpha 
contamination for each day of the SMV and for all SMVs; 
• SChE –gamma exposure rates, surface alpha contamination, and airborne alpha 
contamination averaged for the 5 days of each SMV; 
• UEIE –gamma exposure rates, surface alpha contamination, airborne alpha 
contamination, and neutron dose rates at the BDMS room averaged over a one-month 
period with August-September averaged together over two-month period.  
 
The graphs in Appendix B (Appendix B is a separate C/FGI-MOD document) provide the 
gamma exposure levels and the airborne and surface contamination at the monitoring 
points and guiding action levels for each of the plants in 2007. 
 
The gamma exposure rates at all plants were about 10 times or more below the “Low 
Dose” action level.  The highest gamma exposure rates (up to 30 µSv/hr) are encountered 
in the U3O8 storage facility at ECP.  This may be due to the measurement practice at 
ECP.  Exposure rates from the U3O8 containers are measured upon a new shipment 
arrival when the storage facility is full. 
 
The surface alpha contamination levels in general are below the “Low Dose” action level 
and vary greatly among plants and locations.   The surface contamination levels are the 
lowest at UEIE and the highest at SChE.   At the SChE Conversion Plant’s fluorination 
facility and at the Chemical and Metallurgical (C&M) Plant’s purification glove box and 
withdrawal station the surface contamination levels exceed the “Low Dose” action levels 
which provides further emphasis to the requirement that monitors use personal protective 
equipment (lab coats, gloves, etc.) and avoid touching Russian equipment.    
 
The airborne contamination is below the “Low Dose” action level in all plants.  The 
lowest reporting levels are in UEIE and ECP, and the highest levels are in the SChE 
Conversion Plant’s withdrawal station and UF6 storage room, in the SChE Chemical and 
Metallurgical (C&M) Plant’s purification glovebox and HEU chips and components 
storage room, and in MPA’s oxidation facility. 
 
Detailed plant radiological data along with the action levels and the recommended 
precautions are included in each trip’s Team Instructions Book. 
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Health physics support of the BDMS activities 
 
During CY 2007 LLNL provided health physics support during the BDMS sources 
replacement at ECP and UEIE.  The sources at SChE were not replaced in 2007 since 
Am-241 has a very long half-life while the Cf-252 sources will be replaced in 2008.  
LLNL provided support for the dose rate measurements around the Blend Down 
Monitoring Systems (BDMSs) for Russian regulatory compliance and support for neutron 
dosimetry to UEIE, the Russian Federal Nuclear Center - Institute of Technical Physics 
(VNIITF, C-70), and ECP. 
 
Neutron and gamma dose rate measurements for regulatory compliance and radiation 
safety reports for the BDMS source replacement 
A consistent dose rate measurement methodology for regulatory compliance is used in all 
Russian plants.  This methodology improves the accuracy and allows a better comparison 
of measurement results from different years and different sources.  The quality and the 
accuracy of the measurement results provide additional confidence in the source 
characteristics and their proper installation and manipulation.  During the ECP and UEIE 
source replacement visits, detailed gamma and neutron dose rate measurements were 
performed at the surface and at one meter from all BDMS units with the assistance and in 
the presence of the U.S. HEU health physicist.  The measurement results were included 
in the radiation safety reports for the BDMS sources replacements.  The radiation safety 
reports indicate that during and after source replacement the individual doses, as well as 
the gamma and neutron dose rates around the BDMS, did not exceed the Russian 
radiation safety limits.  We applied (with ECP and UEIE concurrence) less stringent 
regulatory limits that are based on the lower occupancy levels (less than 8 hr/day and 40 
hr/week) in the BDMS premises. These less stringent limits allow six times higher 
radiation dose rates at 1 meter from the BDMS units and allow the use of stronger 
sources that can improve the accuracy of the mass flow measurement and can increase 
the time between source changes resulting in substantial savings to the HEU 
Transparency Program.  The new regulatory limits are reflected in the BDMS radiation 
safety reports.  
 
The UEIE annex does not mention any radiation safety report or dose rate measurements 
during the BDMS source replacement.  ECP and SChE annexes were negotiated after the 
difficulties experienced with obtaining a detailed radiation safety report from UEIE.  
Both ECP and SChE annexes state that upon U.S. request the plant shall provide “….the 
results of dosimetric confirmation measurements at the HEU-LEU blending area during 
the replacement of radioactive sources.”  In 2007 we received the following BDMS 
radiation safety reports: 
 
• ECP - the report includes the data from each measurement and it was signed by the 
ECP Radiation Safety and the U.S. HEU health physicist.  Air monitoring data for 
alpha and beta contamination as well as for surface contamination at the blend point 
during the visit were below Russian and US regulatory limits and were included in 
the report.  We obtained the signed radiation safety report at the end of the source 
change visit. 
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• UEIE - the report includes the averaged (over all six FM and EM modules) and the 
maximum dose rates as in the 2005 and 2006 reports, contrary to the detailed data in 
the 2002-2004 reports. The report is signed by the UEIE radiation safety as in 2005-
2006, contrary to the previous practice when both UEIE and U.S. health physicist 
signed the report.  The report was provided to the U.S. at the end of the source change 
visit. 
 
The BDMS radiation safety reports document that during and after source replacement 
the individual doses to all Russian and U.S. personnel involved, as well as the gamma 
and neutron dose rates around the BDMS, did not exceed the Russian radiation safety 
limits and that all source replacement operations were conducted adhering to the ALARA 
(As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle.  
  
BDMS sources specifications 
The source specifications were developed in earlier years in a manner to maximize the 
output and the reliability of the BDMS measurements and, in the same time, to comply 
with the Russian Federation radiation safety regulatory limits.  The specifics of the dose 
rate measurement instrumentation and treatment of measurement errors were taken into 
account in the development of the source specifications.  
 
Bubble dosimeters   
During CY 2007 LLNL shipped 110 bubble dosimeters with high sensitivity (~ 20-30 
bubbles per mrem) to ECP and UEIE to support the BDMS sources changes (55 
dosimeters per campaign).  Prior to shipment of the bubble dosimeters to Russia, LLNL 
tested their calibration with Cf-252 source (The manufacturer calibrates them with Am-
Be source.) and, if needed, excluded or exchanged any dosimeters out of tolerance. The 
bubble dosimeters are used to measure the personal neutron doses for the involved plant, 
VNIITF and U.S. personnel, as well as, for area monitoring around BDMS.  The bubble 
dosimeter information is valuable for the U.S. monitors and the Russian personnel as an 
immediate indication in case of a significant neutron exposure or radiation leakage from 
the BDMS shielding.  The current status of the mutually-agreed-to number of bubble 
dosimeters for the source replacement visits is shown in Table 1.   
 
Table 1 – Current status of the number of bubble dosimeters 
 
 Cf-252 source change Co-57 only source change 
UEIE 40 20 
ECP 30 20 
SChE 40-50 0 
 
LLNL is exploring the possibility of further reducing the number of the supplied bubble 
dosimeters consistent with good radiation safety practice and the radiation safety 
measures and controls during source replacement and relative Cf sources measurements.  
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Information on DARTS 
The available data on DARTS in the BDMS directory include two folders – BDMS 
Sources and Bubble Dosimeters for the use of the HEU community.  
 
The BDMS Sources folder contains: 
• All current and past Cf-252, Co-57 and Am-241 passports for UEIE, ECP and SChE 
BDMS sources 
• Co-57, Am-241, and Cf-252 source specifications  
• All radiation safety reports for the source change activities in English and the Russian 
originals for UEIE, ECP and SChE 
• Tables of the detailed dose rate (gamma+neutron) measurements at UEIE, ECP and 
SChE for regulatory compliance 
• Tables  of the relative californium source measurements of the new, old, and the 
reference sources with any pertinent information for source changes and installations 
at the three plants 
• Tables of the Cf-252, Co-57, and Am-241 source positions at UEIE, ECP, and SChE 
 
The bubble dosimeter folder on DARTS contains: 
• Test results from the 2002 certification of the bubble dosimeters by Doza (in Russian) 
• Bubble Dosimeter Accreditation certificate - original in Russian and the English 
translation 
• Accreditation testing report and description - in Russian and in English 
 
Reporting 
 
In 2007 LLNL provided the following reports related to the health physics issues of the 
HEU Transparency Program activities: 
• Post trip dose reports after each trip 
• Quarterly bioassay (internal dosimetry) reports  
• 2006 Annual Health Physics Report for the HEU Transparency Program  
• 2006 Annual Occupational Dose Reports to each monitor that had a trip to Russia 
• 2006 Annual Occupational Dose Reports to the POC for all monitors in his area 
• U.S.-Russian radiation safety reports for regulatory compliance after the UEIE and 
ECP BDMS source replacement. 
• Reports on various health physics topics requested by the HEU Transparency 
Program management 
 
In 2007, the HEU Transparency activities in Russia were conducted in a radiologically 
safe manner for the HEU Transparency monitors in accordance with the expectations of 
the HEU Transparency staff, NNSA and DOE.  The HEU Transparency now has twelve 
years of successful experience in developing and providing health and safety support in 
meeting its technical objectives.  
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Appendix A 
 
2007 Timely Bioassay Sample Compliance 
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Appendix B 
 
Appendix B is a separate document that is marked C/FGI-MOD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
